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.\IWHAEL DALE GILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11783 
The appellant was convicted by a jury of the crime of 
,·nbber)' in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
Count:-' of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Merrill 
C. Faux. Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried and convicted of robbery June 
-> 1 and -subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate 
term in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent prays thi-s Court will affirm the action 
r1f the trial court below. 
2 
STATE.\IE:\'T OF THE FACTS 
The i·espondent wish L'S to make his 0\111 , 
the facts notwithstanding- tlw statement madt- I>:. il\l!H'!i;i:,: 
on pag:es 2 through ;->of his b1·ief. 
On Novembe!' 1, 19()1, Barman's Take-Honie (';u1 
located in Salt Lake l 1tah, was rnblied by two mei. 
( T. 6-K). Mal"ilyn l\larx, rnanage1· of Harman's, was pre<-
ent during· the robbe1»· ( T. 1)-K), ;l's \\'as Kimbal; 
( T. G). Subsequt•ntl,1, i\Ja!'i\.\·11 l\Iarx was taken bl ;\ lineu1: 
and identified the appellant as thL' one having 
committed the crime ( T. 1:1-11); ho\\'e\'el', such identifica-
tion was not ente1·ecl as evidenc:e lJ.Y the Stall•_ Sulio;•_·-
at trial, Mmx made an in-cumt identifi-
cation of the appelhnt based on he1· recollection uf th(' 
appellant during the c·ommission of the alleged crime 1 T. 
:)-12) as clid She1·y\ Kimball (T. 24-25). l\Ioreover, Lind;: 
Fehmal, who arlmittecl lwing «n access01·y to the crime IT. 
28-:1:1), also identified the appellant as the perpetrntor 1T. 
:2K-:1:3). Afte1· all the evirlence had been presented and the 
instn1c:ted. a \'erdic:t of g·uilt>' was i·etunwd li, thf 
( T. 1-g). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IK PRE-
Y ENTIN G CROSS-EXAMINATION WHICH 
\VAS IRRELEVENT TO THE ISSUES BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
Th\ :1ppr·lLrnt c11 ntr·nds th:tt he· 11':\'s prr•judicc-d l>ecallM' 
,,;JllS(•] .·,\ • ll it ;tl'.,1,', l'd c!l c·(,,o·,..;-l'Xamine ;, jll'OSl'C:Ulioll 
..... !., 1·;:_\ n :1L:rx. :t.-. t11 t:1,· cii'n1m.-;tann's su1Tound-
,I 
1!Jl•'ll!l ! Olldlid<.•d pl'io1· to lilt' tl'ial. Ile i't11·ther l'Oll-
'I' tl1:1.t >t1«h c1'11:--. ;-t•x:1rnination \\·a:' prllpel' a . ..; a nwarh 
. '. ::1;..o till ll'!•dihilit:: of the witness's sulisPqUPnt in-
·,!, 11c!t'i(;1tion :rnd that thP cotllt erred when it sus-
:.11·1,·il th1• p1·osP«t1tion's ol>.iediun to sud1 
<:1 <111 th(· tll:\t it \1·;,s irn•k\·ant and 011hid,. thl' 
" 'I•· "' 
Tlw n·sp\!n1:Pnt admits that cross-examination of a 
·: ;ws-; is :1 111,tt,•;· 11f 1·ig:ht. :1/tonf V. l'nit1·d Stall's, 
\ ·. ;.; 1:.'\I ( :c!Hl that wiclt' latitude should be allowed 
1:1 < rns,'-'-(''\:1mination if such examination would elicit facts 
r,.:t "1·11:.ild hPlp rnthcr than confuse the jury, Stat!' v. Day, 
( >r. l'JX, P. :30 ( 1964). Howe\'<'!', the eourt 
1 to )ll'l'mit questions on c1·os-s-examination where the 
::1 · 1rn:ation sought to be elicited is irrelevant, Gallegos v. 
i'1r11J/1. 1.17 Colo. 103 P. :Zd 864 ( 1965), cert. denied, 
1 · S. 911, and \\·as not testified to on direct-examina-
:.i()n, Sta tr v. Sterens, 119 Mont. 169, 172 P. 2d 299 (1946) . 
. \l 0 1rc·.•-.«'l'. it is the prerogati,·e of the trial court to decide 
"' :.,•ti1t·1· 01· not such crnss-examination is proper or im-
:' ·11)1c'l". ,\'fate v. Anderson, 16 Wash. 2d 864, 285 P. 2d 879 
: 1 '.i-,.-1). and, unless it can be shown that the court abused 
•h;•t discretion, the ruling should not be disturbed on 
'PJW<I l. 
The dialogue 111 question is quoted on pages 3-5 of 
tppellant's brief. It can readily be seen that there were 
011].\· b\·o questi"ib \\·hich c1Jllll:>t•l !"or ;qipellant wa, ': 
ptTmitted to ask. Boi.h of these qm\.."-tio11,; dealt with 
1,r not the1·e wen.• any Mexi<:ans or Negroes in the lineur 
which was conduct,'.'."\ pri•Jl' to trial; ht1\•:eve1·. th 1• 
of lineup never came in as evidence during the cour,, 
of the trial. ::'-Jotwithstanding, the appellant contends that 
he should have been allmYed to ask quc·stions as t1) th, 
nature of the lineup a·s a means to test tlw credibilit\ 111 
the witness's in-court idf'ntification oC the appelhmt. 
However, the in-court identification was not based on 
the lineup; rather, it was based on the witness's rec:ollet-
tion of the appellant du1·in51,· the commission of the allegt1i 
rnbbery ( T. F>-1:2). The appellant contends. howeYer, that 
the "·itness's 1·ecollection may have been tainted b.\· th .. 
lineup, thus placing the credibility of the in-court identifi-
cation in issue. Such a theo1·y of impeachment i1-> permissi-
ble under the law; howeve1-, it is the position of the re· 
spondent that the appellant was afforded every legal ri;rht 
to attempt impeachment based on that theory. The appel-
lant was pe1·mitted to ask whethe1· or not there was a lineup 
(T. 1:1) and whether 01· not the witness had been told thl 
name of the appellant at the lineup (T. 13). 1VIoreme1". the 
appellant was permitted to cross-examine as to whetht1 
or not the witness knew the brother of the appellant, James 
Gill ( T. 12. 18). Obviously, the thrnst of the questions 
to show that the witness may have confused the appellant 
with his brnthe1', James, and that had it not been for the 
lineup, the in-court identification could not have been made. 
The dialogue quoted on pages 3-:-) of appellant's brief sho\1 s 
! ,,it tlw ;qi1wllant 11·as Ill fact gr::nlL"fl suffi<:il'nt ."c·o1w on 
. to rnisL' thl' impeachment inferencf'. 
i ;,,11 .'H'l'. tlH·n· i;-; no basis on which one could argue that 
•J:, . .;ti<Jns ob.il'dect to, i.e., whether or not therP \\'ere 
\,"ci"lp-; r:r :\kxicans in the lineup, had an\ rele\'allc\ t(> 
dwtlwr n1· n1>t the had rnnfused the of the 
1:1pellant 11·itli his brother James. Such questions g-o to 
the r" in . ..; ti tutional validity of the lineup \\'hich wa:s not in 
:-;:-,U« in this case bet.:ause the in-court identification wa.-; 
11"t L'11tPred <is evidence. l\IorP(Jver, such qu&<>tions had no 
bearing •Jll the of the witness's credibility. Clearly, 
i:w questions were irrelevant and had no purpose other 
than to rnni'use the .iurr and cloud the real issues before 
th" court. 
POINT II. 
IF THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF APPEL-
RIGHT OF CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
SlTH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND IS NOT 
GROl'NDS FOR REVERSAL. 
l'tah Code Ann.§ 77-42-1 (195:1) provides: 
"After having an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rir1hts of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shaU not be pre-
sumed to have rC'Sulted in prejudice. The court 
must l>e satisfied that it has that effect before it 
is warranted in reversing the judgment." ( Empha-
sis added.) 
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T1i,. 1n·i1w1plv-; , il1:J()di1·d i11 ·11· · l 
" ·' < t l ' '.' 111 <llCIJI'( i\'!1.: 
cu l' ll t l ' , ll st it u 1 i a I Lt\\ . 111 ('ha JJ Iii an v. ('al /j 0 , n ir• .. , l, .,, t 
t ·. S. 1 ;-; ( I tlw l '11ited ::-;tat\.':; Supreme Court 
that er!·1n· "h.;nni1·,;,; iw,l'<>lHI a reasonable doubt," frJ. ;:· 
:.! l. i,; iwl J.!,'i'()lllld,; fo1· i'<'\ u·,;a] L'Yen if tht.• allegeii l'JI., 
d1'al; i\ ith ('(>lL-;tituti.,n;d rig),ts. nast>cl !)Jl Uwse jJl'llll'i!Jlt· 
tl1is Cm.rt in : .... ·t11i1 v .. 1111/e1.'w11, ()I) Cbh 0:->1, :..'.-)] l' .. ;.; 
( l 'l:!ti) .,.iid 1J:1 tllv is.;u1• o:· imprnper l'l'\JSs-ex;1111inatiun: 
"Conceding· that it is Jl()t p1·01w1· to ;i,;l: ;1 , it· 
ne.ss, either on direct 01· U'<l'Ss-examination, tu 1,;'-" 
sure thP testimony of othe1· witnesses, still. 111 ,.,,,,. 
of the IP hole 1·eco1 d in th is case, the aske,l 
and the answers given could, in no w;1y, be preii111i-
cial to appellant." (Emphasis added.) :2:'d !'. ;.i 
:363. 
Althoug-h the Andenwn case dealt with qU6Stions asked un 
cross-examination which were imprnperly allowed as 
tinguished frnm the instant case where the questions \\'er, 
not pei-mitte<l, the principle is the same, i.e., unless the 
appellant can sho\\ S!lbstantial prejudice in 1·ir11· of t/11 
ll'hole rcr·ord. due to the alleged enor, he is not entitled t1, 
a 1·even;al. 
The 1·espon<lent submits, in view of the whole rec-
onl, appellant's rights we1·e not substantially preju-
diced. It is clear that appellant's was that 1Iarilyn 
Marx had mistaken James Gill, the brother of the appel-
lant, for the appellant himself. Based on this theory, the 
appellant \\"as able to cross-examine Marilyn Marx regartl-
inp: her knowledge of James Gill ( T. 12, 13). He thor-
oughly cro.-;s-ex:tmined her on her pPrceptivity of the event,;; 
7 
,,:, t:11· :li:, ;x:•d lTlLll' ( 'J'. l :tlld ;t,.; ti• lJt'I' 
i"'· t·> iii. ph.\-.ical diff"1·l'lll'l'S lil't\\'c•1·n .Janws 
, ,1:: ·11.: ti:, :l!lpl'il::lit ( T. L:th·r. thl' appl'llant 
·, . .,":11.•d e\·irienc1· that in fact .Jam<'s Gill and not the 
. •:"·:'. i:l h;td <'1lillnitted thl· all<·ged rnliiwr_;· (T. 
,, -. it :'l'l'l11c- d<'ar t!;;1t ;1ppellant \1·as ).'.T:rnted en•r\ 
, , 11 :1!,Jt• L:tite1<k' to com·irn:e th(' .iur.\· ti1:1t .fames and 
had rnmmitted tlw crinw. It \1ould llf' 
'ii!1g: 1·t•:1 .. ;on to cone:ltale that the appellant \\'a.;; sub-
.-t.:11·,::d!_\ pn·.iudiced liec-:1 l!S<' tlw court denied him the 
, to ;1..;k :\Ia1·ilyn Marx if the1·e were '.\Iexieans or 
\1•;.:1"''' in tlw lineup; especiall.\ is this tn1p when the 
Tllc• alle1rP<l <'l'l'OI' is harmless on still another ground. 
,11 Jln11;n!ffo>1 V. Ca.liforn:a, :19G lT. S. (1969), the 
.. C()u1·t affinned the c01n-ic:tion of the appellant 
''Li1· 1:1 tht• o\·p1·11·helming- evidenc:p against him notwith-
·.t;: his rnn•.'>titutional allegations of PITOJ'. In the 
:• -t:t;11. C:<\St'. like in Han·inflf(Jn, the t•\·idenc:e of g-uilty 
: 1i1 1 :-:t the appellant ts o\·erwhelming notll'ithstanding the 
ll":'<Lt11,n that counsel for the appellant was improperly 
liP1itv:i <ll1 his crnss-examination of :\Iarilyn ?lfarx. 
_'.;;" \: dear!:· identified the app('llant as the one who com-
itted the: c:l'ime (T. 8. 9, as did Sheryl Kimball (T. 
.1, another of the State's \\'itnesses, whose testimony 
i:lc1dentall\· is not e:hallenged by the appellant. Moreover, 
Linda Fehmal, a third State's witness. admitted being an 
to the crime, and testified that the appellant 
11 ;is the pe1·petrator ( T. 28-33). 
In ligi1t uf thl' h'stirnuil\- lwfon' the 1·u1·-_ \\·hic1' 1 1• 1 • . ' :..; )r, 
challt'ng·pr[ \yy the appl'llant. it seems l·leal' that thl' evidr::ni·, 
points to appellant's guilt beyond a rea.,;<,·'.-
alile doubt. Thus, c'ven though el'ror may have lwen cun;. 
milted '>dwn couns1:'l for appellant c1·oss-examined :\Iarily1, 
i\Iarx, in light of otht.'l' existing t.>vidence pointing to app\-':. 
!ant's guilt, such l'!Tor is not grnunds for rever"'in;r 
l'UJinµ: of the Jmn'I' COUit. 
The l"c>spondent sulm1its that the lower court did 11 .. 1_ 
abuse its disc1·etion in not allowing- certain questions prof-
fered by appellant's counsel during the cross-examination 
of .'.\Iarilyn Marx; but, if this Court fin<ls that in fact such 
limitation was enor, then the respondent submits that such 
enor was harmless and thus not grounds fo1· reversing the 
court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROl\'INEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Rrspondn11 
